R 142012Z NOV 24 MARADMIN 547/24 MSGID/GENADMIN/CMC WASHINGTON DC PPO PO// SUBJ/EMPLOYMENT OF CRASH-RATED ACTIVE VEHICLE BARRIERS// REF/A/OUSD I&S Memorandum DoD Memorandum-Employment of  Active Barriers, May 13, 2024// REF/B/MCO 5530.13// REF/C/DEPSECDEF Memorandum-Installation Security and  Unauthorized Installation Access, April 4, 2019// REF/D/OUSD I&S Installation Security and Unauthorized  Installation Access Reporting Requirements, September 7,  2021// REF/E/DoDM 5200.08, Vol 3, Physical Security Program:  Access to DoD Installations, September 18, 2020// REF/F/UFC 4-022-01/July 27, 2017// REF/G/UFC 4-022-02/June 8, 2009// REF/H/DoDD 5210.56, Arming and the Use of Force, November  18, 2016// REF/I/MCO 5500.6H// REF/J/ CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of  Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces, June 18, 2008  (CONTENT IS CLASSIFIED)//  REF/K/MCO 5210.11F// REF/L/MCO 5530.14A// REF/M/MCO 3302.1F// REF/N/Naval Message R1014444Z JUN 22 - USMC Reporting  Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (SUAS and Unauthorized Installation Incidents Worldwide (MOD1)//  REF/O/Naval Message R281529Z JUN24 – Updated USMC  Reporting Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft// REFERENCE (A) IS THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY MEMORANDUM ADDRESSING THE  EMPLOYMENT OF ACTIVE VEHICLE BARRIERS.  NARR/REFERENCE (B) IS THE MARINE CORPS SITE PERIMETER  ACCESS CONTROL ORDER.  REFERENCE (C) IS THE DEPSECDEF MEMORANDUM THAT DEFINES  ATTEMPTED AND SUCCESSFUL UNAUTHORIZED INSTALLATION ACCESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE STOPS.  REFERENCE (D) IS THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY MEMORANDUM THAT FURTHER ADDRESSES UNAUTHORIZED INSTALLATION ACCESS AND REPORTING  REQUIREMENTS.  REFERENCE (E) IS THE DOD MANUAL PROVIDING POLICY FOR  ACCESS CONTROL TO DOD INSTALLATIONS.  REFERENCE (F) IS UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA 4-022-01,  SECURITY ENGINEERING: ENTRY CONTROL FACILITIES/ACCESS  CONTROL POINTS.  REFERENCE (G) IS UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA  4-022-02, SELECTION AND APPLICATION OF VEHICLE BARRIERS.  REFERENCE (H) IS THE DOD DIRECTIVE ARMING AND THE USE OF  FORCE. REFERENCE (I) IS THE ARMING OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND  SECURITY PERSONNEL AND THE USE OF FORCE MARINE CORPS  ORDER. REFERENCE (J) IS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT/STANDING RULES  FOR THE USE OF FORCE FOR US FORCES. REFERENCE (K) IS THE  MARINE CORPS RECORDS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM. REFERENCE (L) IS  THE MARINE CORPS PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM MANUAL.  REFERENCE (M) IS THE AUTOMATED MESSAGE HANDLING SYSTEM  MESSAGE THAT PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR REPORTING REQUIREMENTS  FOR SUAS INCIDENTS, INCURSIONS, AND C-SUASENGAGEMENTS.  REFERENCE (N) IS THE AUTOMATED MESSAGE HANDLING SYSTEM  MESSAGE THAT CONSOLIDATES AND CLARIFIES SMALL UNMANNED  AIRCRAFT SYSTEM-RELATED REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN  REFERENCE (M). // POC/T. PIERCE/CIV/PP&O POP/[email protected]/ (703) 695-7202// POC/K. PANG/GYSGT/PP&O POP/[email protected]/ (703) 692-4272// POC/M. TOOPS/CTR/PP&O POP/[email protected]/ (703) 692-4234// GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. Physical security is critical to  ensuring mission readiness and the safety and security of  Marines, service members, their families, and civilians  aboard Marine Corps sites. Access control is a key element of physical security, ensuring only authorized personnel  and visitors gain access to our sites and installations.  Drivers of vehicles that breach the site security perimeter Entry Control Facility (ECF)/Access Control Point (ACP)  without authorization pose a threat to site security  personnel, occupants of the installation, and the assets  and resources supporting Fleet Marine Force missions. The  employment of crash-rated active vehicle barriers (AVBs), also identified as Final Denial Barriers, are highly  effective in preventing breaches when such barriers are  present, operable, and properly installed as outlined  below. This MARADMIN implements reference (a), reinforces  unauthorized installation access guidelines, and provides  guidance on the employment of crash-rated active vehicle  barriers during installation access control operations.  This MARADMIN addresses required notifications, as  directed in reference (a), for AVBs that are improperly  placed and AVBs that are inoperable for more than 30 total  days in a 12-month period. 2. Background. Marine Corps site perimeter access control  requirements contained in reference (b) require all  persons entering Marine Corps sites to have their identity  established and verified, be determined fit for access,  and establish a purpose for access.  3. Unauthorized Installation Access. Reference (c)  addresses unauthorized installation access and provides:  3.A. Attempted unauthorized installation access is defined as one or more individuals attempting to enter the  installation without both completing the proper access  control procedure and being granted access by security  personnel, regardless of their intent.  3.B. Successful unauthorized installation access is  defined as one or more individuals proceeding past the  final point at which they would be forced to stop, such as  by a crash-rated vehicle or denial barrier at an entry  control point or by a perimeter fence or wall, regardless  of their intent. 3.C. Administrative stops, by a non-rated barrier (e.g.,  concrete/jersey barriers, tire shredders, etc.) or  pursuing security forces, are considered a successful  unauthorized installation access if they occur past the  final point at which they would be forced to stop (i.e.,  beyond the site ECF/ACP).  3.D. Reference (d) identifies that an attempt to enter the installation includes proceeding in the direction onto the installation, past the point where the individual first  begins the access control process required in references  (b) and (e).  3.E. Reference (d) notes that an individual who is denied access during the access control process and departs the installation through a turnaround conducted under the  continuous control of security personnel is not considered to have attempted to access the installation.   4. Employment of crash-rated AVBs. Reference (a) provides  that an AVB is a barrier that can be configured to either  permit or deny entry of a vehicle and can be quickly  switched between two configurations through an action by  security personnel; and employment of an AVB is taking  action to switch an AVB to the configuration in which a  vehicle is denied entry. Reference (a) further notes: 4.A. Site commanders are responsible for ensuring security  personnel are able to quickly, confidently, and  appropriately employ any crash-rated AVBs present at the  installation to mitigate threats, control access to the  installation, and protect the installation and its  personnel. DoD analysis of reporting of attempted and  successful unauthorized installation access events show  that security personnel often do not employ present,  operable AVBs during the events and these decisions often lead to unauthorized  installation access resulting in the breach of the  installation perimeter when it could reasonably have been  prevented.  4.B. A crash-rated AVB is not likely to cause death or  serious bodily harm when it is properly placed, which  means when it is placed in a manner that a typical  approaching driver is likely able to see it with  sufficient time and distance to slow or stop before  contacting the AVB. Factors that determine whether a  crash-rated AVB is properly placed include, but are not  limited to, lighting, signage, the barrier's paint scheme  and the barriers physical location relative to the  ECF/ACP. There remains a risk of collateral  damage to vehicles and occupants other than the intended  target when an AVB is deployed. Site security personnel  must maintain awareness of drivers of vehicles in adjacent  lanes who may be unaware of the AVB activation and may  still face risks due to the limited time they have to  react. This risk can be reduced through training and  methods outlined in reference (f). Reference (f) provides  guidance related to the planning, design, and further  requirements for an ECF/ACP while reference (g) provides  guidance for planning, design, construction, and  maintenance of vehicle barriers, to include AVBs.  5. Employment of AVBs. Reference (a) directs: 5.A. Site security personnel at an ECF/ACP in the United  States will employ a properly placed crash-rated AVB that is present and operable when the apparent intent of a  driver of an inbound vehicle is to breach the installation  security perimeter without authorization, unless security  personnel can determine and clearly articulate how: 5.A.1. The driver does not pose a threat; or 5.A.2. The use of a crash-rated AVB would not be  objectively reasonable based on the totality of the  circumstances, including the visibility of the AVB at the time of the breach. 5.B. Site security personnel will be expected to  specifically articulate the rationale behind their decision not to employ a properly placed crash-rated AVB,  and when their decisions are not objectively reasonable,  commanders must direct remedial training.  5.C. Commanders should consider appropriate disciplinary  or administrative actions for security personnel who  inexplicably or unreasonably fail to employ AVBs in such  a manner consistent with this guidance on a repeated basis. 5.D. Commanders, with support from the site Provost  Marshal, Police Chief, or Security Officer, and servicing  legal office will establish, maintain, and regularly train  security personnel on: 5.D.1. Standards for determining objective reasonableness  when using force consistent with the law, and  references (h), (i) and (j); 5.D.2. Procedures for the employment of all crash-rated  AVBs present at the site, including AVB response and  cycle times; and 5.D.3. Circumstances and situations which would preclude  the employment of a properly placed crash-rated AVB. 5.E. Testing. Site commanders are responsible for properly  maintaining AVBs and will ensure AVBs are tested at least  monthly in accordance with reference (a). Tests will be  recorded manually or electronically, and records will be  maintained in accordance with reference (j). 6. Required Notifications.  6.A. As directed in reference (a), the following  notifications are required: 6.A.1. Within 30 days of a determination that a present,  operable crash-rated AVB is improperly placed; and/or  6.A.2. It is determined that a crash-rated AVB present at  the installation has been inoperable for more than 30 days  in any 12 month period.  6.A.3. Marine Corps Sites 6.A.3.A. Marine Corps Installations. For the incidents  outlined in paragraph 6.A.1 and 6.A.2, commanders are  required to notify the Deputy Commandant (DC)  Installations and Logistics (I&L) (COMMCICOM G3) and the  DC Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O), Protection  Branch (POP) at CMC PPO POP WASHINGTON DC, via the  Automated Message Handling System (AMHS), including the  chain of command. Service Level Training Installations  will ensure that the CG TECOM is included in all  notifications. COMMCICOM G3 is further required to notify  the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (OUSD)  Intelligence and Security (I&S), via  e-mail at the OUSD I&S organization mailbox: osd.pentagon.ousd-intel-sec.mbx.dod-physical-security@mail .mil, upon notification, and include the PP&O, Operations  Division Protection Branch, Physical Security  organizational organization mailbox at  [email protected].  6.A.3.B. Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) Sites. For the  incidents outlined in paragraph 6.A.1 and 6.A.2, commanders are required to notify the Commander, MARFORRES (COMMARFORRES) and the DC PP&O, Protection Branch (POP),  at CMC PPO POP WASHINGTON DC, via the AMHS, including the  chain of command. COMMARFORRES is further required to  notify OUSD I&S, via e-mail at the OUSD I&S organization  mailbox: -osd.pentagon.ousd-intel-sec.mbx.dod-physical- [email protected], upon notification, and include the  PP&O, Operations Division Protection Branch, Physical  Security organizational mailbox:  [email protected]. 6.B. Notifications are intended to facilitate the  development of a corrective action plan. 7. Coordination. This MARADMIN has been coordinated with  the DC I&L, CG TECOM, COMMARFORRES, and Headquarters  Marine Corps Judge Advocate Division.  8. Administration and Logistics 8.A. Guidance contained in this MARADMIN will be included  into the references (i) and (l) update.   8.B. Commanders at sites outside of the United States will coordinate and deconflict the contents of this MARADMIN  with the appropriate Geographical Combatant Commands and  Sub-Unified Command. 8.C. This MARADMIN is applicable to the Total Force. 8.D. This MARADMIN shall remain in effect until the  contents of this MARADMIN are incorporated into the update to references (i) and (k).  8.E. Commanders will ensure all measures are integrated  into and synchronized with their Antiterrorism Plans in  accordance with reference (m). 8.F. Commanders are reminded that reporting of all  incursions is required and will be conducted in accordance with references (n) and (o). 9. Release authorized by Lieutenant General J. W. Bierman,  Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies, and Operations.//