R 141600Z APR 26 MARADMIN 172/26 MSGID/GENADMIN/CMC DC I WASHINGTON DC// SUBJ/MANDATORY USE OF SELECTIVE AVAILABILITY ANTI-SPOOFING  MODULE (SAASM) ENCRYPTION FOR THE AN/PSN-13 DEFENSE ADVANCED GPS RECEIVER (DAGR)// REF/A/DOC/CJCSI 6130.01J/20260107// REF/B/DOC/DODM O-4650.11/20220224// REF/C/DOC/CNSSI 3006/20180201// REF/D/GENADMIN/CMC WASHINGTON DC C4/032017Z OCT 18// REF/E/MI/MARCORSYSCOM/29 NOV 2024// REF/F/DOC/DC CD&I/20260212// NARR/REF A IS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF (CJCS) INSTRUCTION: 2026 POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND TIMING. REF B IS THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) PNT SECURITY MANUAL. REF C IS THE OPERATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE FOR GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) PRECISE POSITIONING SERVICE (PPS) USER EQUIPMENT (UE). REF D IS MARADMIN 566/18, MARINE CORPS MILITARY GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) CRYPTOKEY LOADING COMPLIANCE. REF E IS MI 09880D-12, U.S. MARINE CORPS MODIFICATION INSTRUCTION FOR AN/PSN-13A DAGR RSAM 2.0. REF F IS DC CD&I LETTER 3090, ASSURED AND ALTERNATIVE POSITION NAVIGATION AND TIMING POLICY IMPLEMENTATION FOR POSITION NAVIGATION AND TIMING MODERNIZATION AND NAVIGATION WARFARE COMPLIANCE. POC/DAVID MOORE/CIV/:HQMC IC4/571-256-8824/ [email protected]// POC/JOEL WEBER/CIV/:HQMC IC4/703-614-1900/ [email protected]// POC/LINDSEY STONE/CIV/:HQMC CE INFO/703-432-8328/ [email protected]// POC/GARY LEHMANN/CIV/:HQMC CE INFO/703-432-8597/ [email protected]// POC/GREGORY DAVIS/MAJ/:HQMC IC4/571-256-8817/ [email protected]// GENTEXT/RMKS/ 1.  Situation. This MARADMIN provides guidance on the continued use of encrypted Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) for the AN/PSN-13 Defense Advanced GPS Receiver (DAGR). MARADMIN 566/18 (ref D) has expired. This message reinforces and updates policy to ensure the continued security of the DAGR and other devices with embedded SAASM as we transition to Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE). Other devices include tactical radios (AN/PRC-117G and AN/PRC-163), Tactical Handoff Systems (THS), or Common Laser Range Finder Integrated Capability (CLRF IC). 1.a. Importance of encrypted PNT. Per refs A and B, GPS is the DOD's primary source of PNT. To counter adversary capabilities, DOD policy mandates the use of the Protected Positioning Service (PPS). PPS-SAASM is an encrypted GPS service providing enhanced accuracy and anti-spoofing/anti-jamming (AS/AJ) capabilities not available in the civilian Standard Positioning Service (SPS). The use of PPS-SAASM is critical to enabling resilience against adversary attacks and enabling joint force operations. Failure to adhere to PPS-SAASM will result in inaccurate PNT, severely affecting mission accomplishment, the accuracy of fires, and the overall safety of personnel.  2.  Mission. Effective immediately, all commands will mandate the exclusive use of SAASM encryption for all training, exercise, and operational employment of the DAGR and other SAASM enabled devices to ensure accurate and reliable GPS capability.   3.  Execution. This policy applies to all Marine Corps units that possess, operate, or maintain the SAASM based user equipment (SAASM UE). 3.a. Tasks: 3.b. For any employment of the SAASM UE, the device must be properly loaded with current cryptographic keys and operated in a SAASM-encrypted mode. 3.c. Local Communications Security (COMSEC) account managers will maintain appropriate SAASM keys if they maintain SAASM UE in their command or subordinate commands.  At time of publish the current keys include BKAUPD, BGUV, and BCVM. 3.d. Major Subordinate Command (MSC) COMSEC account managers will ensure proper issuance of keys to subordinate units to support all training and real-world operations. 3.e. Six digit COMSEC account owners will ensure that SAASM encryption is available for all devices with current SAASM modification instructions published by Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC). 3.f. Local S6 elements and fires control elements will ensure SAASM encryption is used on devices which accept SAASM. 3.g. Annual Key Management Infrastructure (KMI) inspections will verify that keying material is available for SAASM. 3.h. Commanding General Readiness Inspection (CGRI) teams will inspect SAASM key issuance logs. 3.i. MEF and MSC G6s sections will distribute to all subordinate  elements Modification Instructions as they are published by MCSC. 4.  Administration and Logistics. The instructions for loading cryptographic keys and upgrading DAGR software are contained in the references and available through standard Marine Corps technical publication channels. 4.a. Units must plan for the re-keying of DAGRs following any software upgrades, as crypto keys are erased during the reprogramming process (ref E). 5. Command and Signal. 5.a. Command. This MARADMIN is applicable to the total force. 5.b. Signal. Questions regarding this guidance should be directed to the POCs listed above. 6.  Release authorized by Lieutenant General J. A. Matos III, Headquarters Marine Corps, Deputy Commandant for Information.//